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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS:
NEW ARGUMENTS FOR LARGE-LOT ZONING
Zoning ordinances requiring large minimum lot sizes' for residential
development have been subject to increased scrutiny in recent years.
The trend is toward invalidation of such restrictions, 2 but the New
Hampshire case of Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanborn-
ton3 suggests that multi-acre zoning will be permitted where it is
necessary to preserve the natural resources of the area and prevent
ecological harm, and where there is no evidence that the ordinance
was enacted for exclusionary purposes. Steel Hill involved a small
rural New England town. A developer wanted to construct a large
number of vacation homes on hills covered by virgin forest. In re-
sponse, the town upgraded the minimum lot size requirements of the
developer's land from three-quarters of an acre to three acres and six
acres.
There are three basic requirements that a zoning ordinance must
meet to withstand constitutional attack: 4 (1) it must bear a rational
relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community, so as to comply with the due process requirements of
1. Large minimum lot sizes, as used here, refers to zoning requirements of one-
half acre or more for a single family residential dwelling.
2. See, e.g., Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341(1964) (two and one-half acres); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971) (one and two acres);
Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two and three acres); Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (upgrading from one-half to two
acres). See generally Note, Constitutionality of Minimum Sizes for Buildings and
Lots, 15 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rnv. 83 (1960); Comment, One Acre Minimum Lot
Size Requirement in Zoning Ordinance Held to be Unconstitutional, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 292 (1957); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). See
also Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22
SYRACUSn L. REv. 537, 562 (1971).
3. 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
4. In addition to the four constitutional considerations, the ordinance must
comply with statutory zoning enabling act requirements. All the states have con-
stitutional provisions substantially similar to the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution. For a complete list of citations see INDEX DIGEST OF STAT.
CONSTTUTIONs 464 (2d ed. 1959).
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the fourteenth amendment;5 (2) it must not reduce the value of the
land so as to constitute a taking without compensation, in violation
of the fifth amendment;G and (3) it must not be so arbitrary and dis-
criminatory that its restrictions are a denial of the equal protection
of the laws.7 The fundamental issue in Steel Hill was whether the
first requirement was satisfied.
New Hampshire, like most jurisdictions, has given its cities and
towns the authority to zone in order to promote public health, safety,
morals and general welfare.s A zoning ordinance enacted under such
a statute may not be declared unconstitutional unless its "provisions
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 9 Further,
zoning ordinances will be presumed valid unless proven unreasonable
or arbitrary.10 The burden of proof is on the challenging party to
show that the ordinance bears no reasonable or substantial relation
to the public health, safety or welfare. 1 The courts will not even
interfere with the judgment of a legislative body where there is room
for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness
of a particular ordinance, or where the question of reasonableness is
fairly debatable. 2
5. The basic rule was laid down in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
17 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
6. See Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, 1969 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 263, 273.
7. Traditional racial and economic exclusionary zoning is often invalidated
on equal protection grounds. A candid view of exclusionary motives in zoning
is provided in Large Lot Zoning, supra note 2, at 1420.
8. N.H. Rrv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:60, 62 (1971). These zoning enabling pro-
visions, like those of many states, are modeled on the Standard Act. See U.S.
DEP'T or COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH
MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926), reprinted in C.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 547 (2d ed. 1949).
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See
also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927).
10. See Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d
390, 395 (1959).
11. See 'McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154, 159 (8th Cir. 1958);
Schadlick v. City of Concord, 108 N.H. 319, 234 A.2d 523 (1967); Bosse v. City
of Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523, 226 A.2d 99 (1967).
12. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill. 2d 344, 350, 125 N.E.2d
609, 612 (1955). See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927). See also Com-




Zoning ordinances requiring large minimum lot sizes have become
increasingly popular.13 Nevertheless, the reaction of courts to these
provisions has not been consistent. 4 In Steel Hill, the district court
upheld a three acre minimum lot size on the ground that it was
reasonably necessary to provide "adequate insurance for the problems
of sewage disposal and drainage that are inevitable in this type of
soil . .. ."15 Courts have shown a willingness to sanction large-lot
zoning where the municipality has made at least a weak attempt to
show that such provisions are designed to promote public health and
safety.36 A number of recent cases,' 7 however, have followed the
reasoning that: "[A]bsent some extraordinary justification, a zoning
ordinance with [large] minimum lot sizes.., is completely unreas-
13. For a discussion of the motivating factors behind large-lot zoning see
Large Lot Zoning, supra note 2, at 1420, and Becker, supra note 6, at 264, with
an analysis of similar factors which have caused suburbanites to discourage
growth in their communities.
14. The trend in the area of large lot requirements seems to be towards in-
validation of such restrictions. For a list of recent leading cases rejecting large-
lot zoning see note 2 supra. A substantial number of courts have upheld zoning
ordinances requiring lots larger than one-half acre on the grounds that they
were reasonably designed to promote public health, safety or welfare. See Con-
federacion de ]a Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (restrictions on low-cost housing in certain areas); Simon v. Town
of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) (one acre); Fischer v.
Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (five acres); Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851
(1958) (one acre).
15. 338 F. Supp. at 305.
16. See Chucta v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 154 Conn. 393, 225 A.2d
822 (1967) (upheld an increase in lot size, in part to provide adequately for a
safe water supply and proper disposition of sewage); Zygmont v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 152 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965) (upheld commission's
rejection of an application to have lot zoning changed from four acres to one-
half acre, in part because of the developer's inability to provide on-site well and
septic systems which would conform to health regulations if the zoning were
changed); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687(1965) (upheld an ordinance requiring a one-half acre minimum lot size for
over 52% of the land in the township, in part to allow the area to pace its de-
velopment to sewer and water-main construction). Several commentators have
"seriously questioned the need for large lot requirements in order to preserve
health and safety in the absence of a public water supply or sewerage system."
Becker, supra note 6, at 306 n.85. For a discussion of the fiscal and technical
data on the relationship between sewerage and water problems and large-lot
zoning see C. NoREN, ARGUMENTs FOR SrMALLER LOT ZONING 4-23 (1968).
17. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424,
244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,
439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two and three acre requirements held invalid
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onable .... "'s even where public health and safety arguments were
made.
The district court in Steel Hill found a six acre minimum not
necessary for health and safety considerations, and therefore sustain-
able, if at all, only on general welfare grounds. 9 On the basis of
arguments and evidence presented by the town, the court found that
a six acre requirement had a substantial relationship to the general
welfare of the comnmunity. -2 Some of the factors considered by the
court included the protection of the ecological balance of the area,
prevention of the despoiling of natural resources, and preservation
of the rural scenic beauty of the landscape.2'
The reasoning adopted by both the district court and the First
Circuit in upholding the three and six acre minimums was substan-
tially the same. These courts took into account the following factors:
(1) the town properly exercised power granted to it under the State
zoning enabling statute22 to "regulate and restrict . . lot sizes...
[for the] purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community;"23 (2) the town demonstrated that the
requirement of large minimum lot sizes was reasonably related to the
objectives of the police power;2-1 (3) there was "no evidence that the
new zoning law was prompted by discrimination of any sort;" 25 (4)
despite arguments that, because of on-site sewerage problems, houses could be
built on three acre lots, but not on one acre lots) ; Delaware County Community
College Appeal, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969); National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (court rejected county's argument
that the purpose of the amendment to the zoning ordinance, requiring a two
acre minimum lot size, was, in part to protect ground water supplies, and prevent
a public health problem by use of private on-site septic systems). See also Oak-
wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (L. Div. 1971).
18. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 471, 268 A.2d 765, 767
(1970).
19. 338 F. Supp. at 305-07.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also 469 F.2d at 960-61.
22. N.H. Ruv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:60, 62 (1971).
23. 469 F.2d at 960.
24. 338 F. Supp. at 306-07.
25. Id. at 306. See generally Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rlv. 767 (1969); Note, Exclu-
sionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. Pzv. 1645 (1971).
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"[n]or was there any showing of population pressures directly or in-
directly impinging on the town;" 26 (5) there was "no evidence that
the amendments constitute either snob zoning or exclusionary zon-
ing;" 27 (6) the zoning ordinance was a stop-gap attempt to control
and pace development-not a permanent barrier;28 and, (7) if these
zoning laws do become permanent barriers to development, then re-
sort to the courts is always possible.20 Both courts summarily dismissed
the developer's arguments that the rezoning greatly reduced the value
of his land so as to constitute a taking without compensation, 0 and
that the classification of his land was violative of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause because it was arbitrary and
discriminatory in restrictions imposed on development. 31
The First Circuit in Steel Hill gave extensive discussion to the issue
of whether the zoning ordinance amounted to exclusionary zoning.32
There was no evidence of any attempt by the town to exclude any
group on racial or economic grounds. 3 There was definitive evidence,
however, of an intent by Sanbornton to exclude the massive recrea-
tional development project which would effectively double the popula-
tion of the town.34 The real question here was whether such develop-
26. 469 F.2d at 961; 338 F. Supp. at 306.
27. 338 F. Supp. at 306. For a discussion of exclusionary zoning see note 7
supra. See also Bergin, Price-Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis, 47 ST.
JoHNs L. REv. 1 (1972); A Survey of the judicial Responses to Exclusionary
Zoning, supra note 2; Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social
Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUsE L. Rav. 507 (1964).
28. 469 F.2d at 962; 338 F. Supp. at 307.
29. 469 F.2d at 962; 338 F. Supp. at 307.
30. The district court stated:
[IThe proper test is not just the size of the lot, but a balancing of the public
objectives promoted by the zoning restriction and the economic burden im-
posed on the owner of the restricted land. The land of the plaintiff has not
been destroyed .... It is true that the change in zoning depresses the imme-
diate sale value of the property for the purpose the plaintiff intended. But
that is not the test. An application of zoning which even substantially re-
duces the value of land, but does not cause a total loss of profitable use is
normally upheld as not confiscatory.
338 F. Supp. at 307. The court then cited Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), where the zoning ordinance was upheld despite a
75% loss alleged by the developer, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915), where a 93% alleged loss was not found unconstitutional.
31. 469 F.2d at 959, 963.
32. Id. at 960-61.
33. 338 F. Supp. at 306.
34. Id. at 304. The district court suggests a desire on the part of the town
to discourage all development, when it suggests that there is "no doubt that
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ment could be excluded on the basis of aesthetic, ecological, and
"character" considerations, and whether large-lot zoning is a permis-
sible means to accomplish this objective.
A number of recent cases35 have invalidated large-lot zoning where
it resulted in "an unnatural limiting of suburban expansion into
towns in the path of population growth ... ."36 In Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated an
ordinance requiring two and three acre lot sizes for a Philadelphia
suburb undergoing rapid growth. The court rejected the township's
arguments that large lot sizes were needed to prevent on-site sewage
problems, preserve the rural and historical surroundings of the neigh-
borhood, and lessen the burden on the township to provide munic-
ipal services.cs
In the earlier Pennsylvania case of National Land & Investment Co.
v. Kohn, 39 the court rejected a four acre minimum lot size require-
ment in a rapidly expanding suburban area. The municipality argued
that the minimum lot size was necessary to prevent the overburden-
ing of existing municipal facilities and services. 40 To this the court
responded:
some members of the Planning Board, and a good number of the townspeople,
were interested in discouraging population density in this area and were generally
determined to try to keep the town as rural as possible." Id. Commenting on the
lack of hard scientific evidence to justify six acre lot sizes, the court of appeals
stated, "[W]e have serious worries whether the basic motivation of the town
meeting was not simply to keep outsiders, provided they wished to come in
quantity, out of the to-wn." 469 F.2d at 962.
35. See, e.g., Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d
567 (1971); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341
(1964); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
36. 469 F.2d at 961.
37. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
38. Id. at 474-78, 268 A.2d at 768-70. At one point the court stated:
Minimum lot sizes of the magnitude required by this ordinance are a great
deal larger than what should be considered as a necessary size for the build-
ing of a house, and are therefore not the proper subjects of public regula-
tion .... Absent some extraordinary justification, a zoning ordinance with
minimum lot sizes such as those in this case is completely unreasonable.
Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767.
39. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
40. Id. at 525, 215 A.2d at 608.
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The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to
live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary
purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the ad-
ministration of public services and facilities can not be held
valid.41
The court also rejected the township's argument that the lot minimum
was essential for maintenance of the "character" of the area, preserva-
tion of open space, and creation of a "greenbelt."42 The court found
that the four acre minimum was not a reasonable method to achieve
these ends, and that purely aesthetic desires and considerations do not
rise to the level of public welfare.43
In the Virginia case of Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,44
a zoning ordinance requiring a two acre lot minimum was struck
down. This large-lot requirement applied to two-thirds of Fairfax
County, a suburb of Washington, D.C., and at that time the fastest
growing county in the United States. The court rejected the county's
argument that the purpose of the zoning ordinance was to protect
ground water supplies, prevent a public health problem by use of
private on-site septic systems, maintain the character of the area, and
preserve available agricultural land.4s
A number of factors present in Kit-Mar, Kohn, and Carper that
were not at issue in the Steel Hill case may account for the divergent
results. In the three exclusionary cases there was direct or indirect
pressure for development, such as an already existing demand for
homes.46 In Steel Hill, however, there was no evidence of any real
pressure for development, but rather an attempt by the developer to
41. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
42. Id. at 528-30, 215 A.2d at 610-11.
43. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 611. The court suggested as a possible alternative
method either the use of cluster zoning, or acquisition of the land with com-
pensation paid. Id. It is interesting to note that the town in Steel Hill expressly
rejected the developer's plan for cluster zoning, despite the favorable environ-
mental and aesthetic attributes of such a technique. See generally Krasnowlecki,
Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of
Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 47 (1965).
44. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
45. Id. at 658-60, 107 S.E.2d at 394-95.
46. 469 F.2d at 961.
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create a demand for homes.47 Kit-Mar, Kohn, and Carper involved
areas where decent housing was in short supply; therefore, the need
was for "first" homes. Steel Hill, on the other hand, dealt with rec-
reational, or "second" homes.4 S Finally, all three of the exclusionary
cases dealt with attempts by municipalities to discourage develop-
ment requiring increased municipal services and facilities.49 In Steel
Hill these fiscal elements were of secondary importance when com-
pared with the environmental considerations.
The emerging rule of these cases is that large-lot zoning may be
invalidated where the effect is to artificially frustrate or eliminate
development of areas located in the path of population growth.50
Where under these circumstances an exclusionary effect results, the
courts seem willing to reject the public health, safety, and welfare
justifications offered in defense of large-lot zoning.
A different principle is evident from cases where the exclusionary
effect was absent. These cases can be analyzed on the basis of per-
missible and non-permissible objectives of large minimum lot size re-
quirements. Both the First Circuit and the district court in Steel Hill
found the protection of aesthetic, character, and ecological elements
to be proper objectives of large-lot zoning.-' The position of the court
of appeals on the community's power to zone in order to protect the
environment was dear:
We recognize, as within the general welfare, concerns relating to
the construction and integration of hundreds of new homes which
would have an irreversible effect on the area's ecological balance,
destroy scenic values, decrease open space, [and] significantly
change the rural character of this small town .... 52
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 474-78, 268 A.2d
765, 768-70 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 525, 215
A.2d 597, 608 (1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
658-59, 107 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1959).
50. In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971), the court suggested that large-lot zoning will
be invalidated where there is a failure to promote a reasonably balanced com-
munity. Here the township had about 30% of its land area vacant and develop-
able. The zoning ordinance restricted multi-family buildings to about 600 addi-
tional one and two bedroom units, and divided most of the remaining land be-
tween zones requiring one and two acre minimums, with large minimum floor
space requirements. The court stated that the township failed to prove that low
population density would safeguard against flood and surface drainage problems.
51. 469 F.2d at 960-61; 338 F. Supp. at 305-07.
52. 469 F.2d at 961.
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The district court in Steel Hill upheld the six acre requirement,
in part, on the basis of aesthetic considerations-possible destruction
of scenic values, reduction of open spaces, and overcrowding.53 Gen-
erally, courts have been unwilling to uphold zoning ordinances based
purely on aesthetic grounds.54 But, in the words of one commentator,
as the "concept and definition of 'public welfare' has expanded, so
too, regard for aesthetic considerations has been more hospitably ac-
cepted as having a growing consideration in the philosophy of zon-
ing."5s
In one of the earliest "aesthetic" cases, Simon v. Town of Need-
ham,56 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a one
acre restriction, in part because low density neighborhoods "w6uld
tend to improve and beautify the town and would harmonize with
the natural characteristics of the locality.... ."5 In Gignoux v. Village
of Kings Point,58 a New York court permitted one-half acre and one
acre requirements, partly because such a requirement would secure
the town from noise and traffic, would promote "rest and relaxation,"
and would enhance the beauty of the village. 9 A one acre minimum
was upheld in Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Board
of Adjustment 60 on general welfare grounds. The court stated that
aesthetic considerations were an important aspect of the general wel-
fare to be considered by the courts.61 In the recent case of Confed-
eracion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill,6I2 a federal district
53. Id.; 338 F. Supp. at 305-07.
54. See 2 J. METZENBAUu, LAW OF ZONING 1577 (1955).
55. Id. For a discussion of an early zoning case where the court stated that
the "quiet and the presence of natural surroundings and even vegetation, on
account of its production of oxygen, may be important elements in preserving
health," see 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTicE 21 (1953). See generally
Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773
(1969); Comment, The Place of Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 104
(1964); Comment, Regulation of Land for Aesthetic Purposes, 15 SYvsAausa L.
Rxv. 33 (1963); Note, Aesthetic Zoning; A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18
U. FLA. L. Rxv. 430 (1965). See also A Survey of the Judicial Responses to
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 2, at 541-42.
56. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
57. Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
58. 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
59. Id. at 491, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
60. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
61. Id. at 72-73, 141 A.2d at 856-57.
62. 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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court upheld a zoning ordinance which regulated housing density in
the hilly and mountainous areas of the city. The express purpose of
the ordinance was to facilitate the orderly and creative development
of the area and preserve and enhance the natural amenities.63 These
"aesthetic" zoning cases demonstrate that preservation of solitude
and maintenance of scenic beauty and open spaces are proper public
welfare concerns."
Preservation of the "character" of an area is analogous to aesthetic
considerations. In upholding the six acre requirement in Steel Hill,
the First Circuit considered the possible damage to the rural character
and charm of the town.65 A substantial number of cases have upheld
large-lot zoning where used primarily to maintain the character of an
area.6 6 Many of these cases, like Steel Hill, were concerned with large-
lot zoning ordinances designed to maintain the hilly and rural nature
of the locality. 6
There has been little discussion in large-lot zoning cases of whether
protection of ecological elements is a proper zoning objective. The
district court in Steel Hill upheld the large-lot zoning in part, on the
basis of ecological considerations: possible destruction of natural re-
sources, pollution of the air and water, and damage to the ecological
balance of the area.6 8 Certain ecological arguments for large-lot zon-
ing, especially those concerning air and water pollution, could be
based on health and safety considerations.69 General welfare argu-
ments could be used to justify large-lot zoning designed to protect
the natural resources and maintain the ecological balance of the area.
This would be most effective in a recreation area, such as Sanborn-
63. Id.
64. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62,
141 A.2d 851 (1958).
65. 469 F.2d at 959, 961.
66. See Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959),
appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960) (upheld zoning amendments that up-
graded a residential area from two to four acres in part to protect the semi-rural,
heavily wooded area); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450
(1967) (upheld a five acre requirement, in part because of the rural and se-
cluded nature of the area, and the historic character of some of the neighbor-
hoods).
67. 469 F.2d at 962.
68. 338 F. Supp. at 305.
69. Id. at 305-07.
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con, where the natural resources are the principal tourist attraction. 0
Steel Hill suggests that environmental considerations may be im-
portant arguments for sustaining large-lot zoning. The result of Steel
Hill could, however, be limited to its facts.71 The First Circuit
strongly suggested that it would have invalidated the large-lot re-
quirements if the ordinance had been a permanent barrier to develop-
ment, rather than a stop-gap measure to prevent unplanned growth.72
The court implied that the town should take steps to formulate a
sound plan for future development, and that large-lot zoning is only
permissible as a temporary measure to allow time for development of
such a plan.
John Anderson
70. Id. at 307. A number of courts have permitted zoning restrictions de-
signed to protect the beauty of tourist areas. In City of Miami Beach v. Ocean
& Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941), the court said: "It is difficult
to see how the success of Miami Beach could continue if its aesthetic appeal
were ignored because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the winter
traveler." Id. at 487, 3 So. 2d at 367. In Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
1953), the court found that the attractiveness of resort areas is "of prime con-
cern to the whole people and therefore affects the welfare of all." Id. at 862.
71. 469 F.2d at 962.
72. Id.
380
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